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The Right to Appear Pro Se:
Developments in the Law*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent history, a constitutional and statutory right to appear
pro se 1 in a criminal case has been recognized in thirty-six states2
and in several federal circuits.3 Moreover, this right has been the
subject of several articles by legal commentators. 4 In 1975, the
Supreme Court recognized for the first time in Faretta v. Califor-
nia,5 an independent constitutional right to appear pro se in a
state criminal case, when waiver of the right to counsel is know-
ingly and intelligently made.6 The Faretta decision has been ex-
tensively analyzed and debated elsewhere. 7 Although both the
* This comment was awarded the first Robert G. Simmons Nebraska Law
Practice Award.
1. Pro se means "for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTioNARY 1364 (4th ed. 1951).
2. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813-14 nn.9 & 10 (1975).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964). The posi-
tion of each circuit is cited in Note, An Accused May Voluntarily and Intelli-
gently Elect to Exercise His Constitutional Right to Self-Representation in a
State Criminal Proceeding, 6 CUM. L. REv. 703, 705 n.16 (1976); as is the posi-
tion of each state, id. at 705-06 nn.20-24.
4. See, e.g., Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Proc-
ess, 54 MwrN. L. REV. 1175 (1970); Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal
Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CAL. L REV. 1479 (1971).
5. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
6. Id. at 807.
7. Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defend-
ant in Trial Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REv. 636 (1977); Schwab, How Far Faretta:
Creating Implied Constitutional Rights, 6 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 1 (1977); Com-
ment, Faretta v. California, An Examination of Its Procedural Deficiencies, 7
COLUM. HumAN RIGHTs L. REv. 553 (1975-76); Comment, The Constitutional
Right of Self-Representation: Faretta and the "Assistance of Counsel," 3 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 336 (1976); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v.
California and Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REV. 423 (1976); Note, Faretta v. California
and the Pro Se Defense: The Constitutional Right of Self-Representation, 25
AM. U. L. REv. 897 (1976); Note, The Sixth Amendment-Self-Representation
and the Assistance of Counsel, 29 ARK. L. REv. 546 (1976); Note, Faretta v.
California: The Constitutional Right to Defend Pro Se, 5 CAP. U. L. REV. 277
(1976); Note, Criminal Procedure-Independent Right of Self-Representation
in Sixth Amendment Permits Defendant to Act as Own Lawyer at State Crim-
inal Trials, 61 CoRNELL L. REv. 1019 (1976); Note, supra note 3; Note, A Con-
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majority and dissenting opinions noted that significant legal
problems might result from elevating the right to a constitutional
level,8 the majority opinion is striking in its failure to offer any gui-
dance as to how such issues might be resolved.
This comment focuses on the development of case law since
Faretta concerning the right to appear pro se. In general, the
cases have consistently reflected the Supreme Court's position
that the right of self-representation is grounded on the concept of
personal freedom,9 rather than on the concepts of justice and fair-
ness that underlie the right to counsel.10 Because implementation
of the right might impede achieving the goal of a fair trial," most
courts have avoided expansion of the right, and in particular have
been unsympathetic to attempts by criminal defendants to use the
right as a manipulative device.12 The right has been jealously pro-
tected by the courts, however, when knowingly and intelligently
exercised by a defendant in a non-disruptive manner. 3 There is
no evidence that the right of self-representation has improved the
stitutional Right to Self-Representation-Faretta v. California, 25 DEPAUL L.
REv. 774 (1976); Note, Faretta v. California: A Dissenter's Point of View, 1976
DET. C. L. REV. 337; Note, Faretta v. California: The Law Helps Those Who
Help Themselves, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 283 (1976); Note, Sixth Amendment-Ap-
pearing Pro Se, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 449 (1976); Note, A Criminal Defendant
Who Makes an Intelligent and Knowing Choice Has a Constitutional Right of
Self-Representation, 53 J. URx. L. 333 (1975); Note, Criminal Law--Defendant
Has Constitutional Right To Defend Himself, 41 Mo. L. REv. 433 (1976); Note,
The Right to Defend Pro Se in Criminal Proceedings-Faretta v. California, 37
OHIO ST. L.J. 220 (1976); Note, A Defendant in a State Criminal Trial Has a
Constitutional Righ Implicit in the Sixth Amendment, to Proceed Without
Counsel When He Voluntarily and Intelligently Elects to Do So, 1976 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 271; Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se-Faretta v. California: Due Process
and Beyond, 11 TULSA L.J. 365 (1976); Note, A Foolfor a Client: The Supreme
Court Rules on the Pro Se Right, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV. 403 (1975).
See, e.g., Schwab, supra, at 1-11; Note, S. ILL. U. L.J., supra at 273-79, for
examples of the heated debate over the validity of the Court's historical and
constitutional analysis.
8. 422 U.S. at 835-36 (majority opinion), at 845-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), at
852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. 'The right to defend is personal." Id. at 834.
10. Id. at 832-33.
11. Self-representation is contrary to the public interest in a fair trial because all
but an extraordinarily small number of pro se defendants are capable of rep-
resenting themselves adequately at trial. Id. at 834. Further, they are equally
incapable of challenging procedural errors made by a prosecutor. This tends
to guarantee a prosecutor victory, a fact which was recognized by the court in
Faretta. Id. at 838-39.
12. See, e.g., notes 47-53 and accompanying text infra. A typical manipulative
device is the attempt by some pro se defendants to begin trial with a court
appointed attorney, then to switch and go pro se with the request for a contin-
uation to "prepare", when in fact all that is sought is a delay in the court
proceedings.
13. See, e.g., notes 57-60 & accompanying text infra.
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functioning of the judicial system or favored the ascertainment of
truth. However, because the courts have prevented the use of self-
representation from disrupting the judicial system, little or no
harm has been done either; and it can be argued that society has
benefited from the positive good of having upheld a philosophically
appealing right to conduct one's own defense in an otherwise im-
personal and hostile criminal justice system.
1. THE FARETTA DECISION
Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, California. Very early in the pro-
ceedings he requested permission to represent himself at trial.
Faretta had successfully represented himself at an earlier trial,
and did not want to be represented by the public defender's office
because he felt the office was overworked and would be unable to
handle his case adequately.14 His request was initially granted.
However, at a subsequent pre-trial hearing the trial judge ques-
tioned Faretta regarding his knowledge of the California hearsay
rule and the rule for voir dire challenges of potential jurors, and
because Faretta's answers revealed an inadequate knowledge of
the legal complexities involved, the judge revoked his right of self-
representation. The judge held that there had not been a knowing
waiver of the right to counsel and that there was no constitutional
right to self-representation. 15
Faretta was given assistance of counsel by the public de-
fender's office. He was later convicted of the crime. His subse-
quent appeals on the local level were unsuccessful. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.16
The question before the Faretta Court was narrowly drawn:
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee
that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded
the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be ... punished by
imprisonment.... The question before us now is whether a defendant in
a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel
when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so .... [T] he question
is whether a State may constitutionally hail a person into its criminal
courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he
wants to conduct his own defense. It is not an easy question, but we have
concluded that a State may not constitutionally do so.1 7
14. 422 U.S. 807 (1975).
15. Id. at 807-08. The Record also indicated that Faretta had had a high school
education.
16. Id. at 808-10. The California Supreme Court had previously ruled that there
was no constitutional right of self-representation in California. People v.
Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 461, 499 P.2d 489, 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, 241 (1972).
17. 422 U.S. at 810-12.
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The Supreme Court found three separate bases for implying an
independent constitutional right of self-representation: (1) prior
case law in the federal circuits;18 (2) the structure of the sixth
amendment itself;19 and (3) the English and colonial history that
led to the enactment of the sixth amendment.2 0 The opinion con-
cluded with an assessment of some of the inherent limitations and
restrictions on the right of self-representation, including the obser-
vation that the right is ultimately grounded in a respect for individ-
ual freedom, not in improving trial procedure; that the right is only
exercised by a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to coun-
sel; and that the pro se defendant would be bound by the rules of
procedure and substantive law and would be unable to complain of
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.21 Dissents by Chief
Justice Burger22 and Justice Blackmun 23 questioned the wisdom
of the holding.
M. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AFFECTING THE RIGHT TO A
PRO SE DEFENSE
The Faretta decision is devoid of any practical procedural
guidelines for litigants who seek to assert the right of self-repre-
sentation, or for courts which must decide whether and how the
right is to be exercised. In theory, the courts could have expanded
the use of self-representation through liberalized rulings on proce-
dural issues. Such expansion could have been justified in that it
would promote the concept of individual freedom which lies at the
root of the right of self-representation. In practice, however, the
opposite has generally occurred-strict procedural rulings have
been rendered in order to narrow the right of self-representation.
This judicial restraint is justified by the need to avoid abuse or op-
portunistic manipulation. Since the right of self-representation
does nothing to promote fair trials or to increase the chances for
ascertainment of truth, the courts have been correct in taking the
restrictive approach.
A. Notice of the Right
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Faretta, posed, without an-
swering, the question whether or not every criminal defendant
must be advised of his right to appear pro se, and if so, when.24 Not
18. Id. at 812-17.
19. Id. at 818-21.
20. Id. at 821-32.
21. Id. at 832-36.
22. Id. at 836-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 846-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 59:135
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surprisingly, several commentators are in disagreement on this is-
sue.25
One commentator suggests that notice is not required because
the Supreme Court stated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte26 that no-
tice of a constitutional right is required only when the right would
promote a fair trial.2 7 Another writer, however, argues that notice
should be given, as failure to give notice makes the right to appear
pro se a hollow right.2 8
The issue has rarely arisen in post Faretta cases,2 9 probably be-
cause the only parties litigating pro se issues are those who re-
quested pro se status initially. Four cases which directly
addressed the issue all held that there is no requirement that the
criminal defendant be informed of the existence of the constitu-
tional right to appear pro se.30 In two of the cases, the courts made
no attempt to articulate why the defendant need not be informed,
stating only that this issue was not involved in the Faretta deci-
sion.31 In the other two decisions, the courts stated only that such
a rule would be "fundamentally unwise, '3 2 when the right is not
25. See Note, ALB. L. REV., supra note 7, at 435-36; Note, Am. U. L. REv., supra
note 7, at 913; Comment, COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV., supra note 7, at 557-
60; Note, HASTINGS L.J., supra note 7, at 297-99; Note, HOFSTRA L. REV., supra
note 7, at 464, Note, J. URB. L., supra note 7, at 344 n.88; Note, Omo ST. L.J.,
supra note 7, at 231-32; Note, S. ILL. U. L.J., supra note 7, at 279 n.58; Note,
TULSA L.J., supra note 7, at 387-88.
26. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
27. Id. at 237. See Note, ALB. L. REV., supra note 7, at 435-36.
28. Note, Omo ST. L.J., supra note 7, at 232. Another author suggested that, "the
right of self-representation can only assume its full potential... if it is guar-
anteed the mandatory notice given to most other constitutional rights." Note,
HASTINGS LJ., supra note 7, at 299.
29. The pre-Faretta cases from jurisdictions recognizing the right of self-repre-
sentation are ambiguous on the issue whether notice must be given to the
defendant that he has a right to appear pro se. For instance, in United States
v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964), the court stated it was "incumbent"
upon the trial court to inform the defendant that he had both a right to coun-
sel and a right to represent himself. Id. at 276. However, the same circuit
court stated in a later case that- "Regardless of whether he has been notified
of his right to defend himself, the criminal defendant must make an unequiv-
ocal request.. . ." Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966). The implication of this dictum seems to be that
notice of the pro se right is not required.
30. People v. Salazar, 74 Cal. App. 3d 875, 888, 141 Cal. Rptr. 753, 761 (1977); Tuck-
son v. State, 364 A.2d 138, 140 (D.C. 1976); State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 548, 220
S.E.2d 495, 518 (1975), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977); State v. Fritz, 21 Wash.
App. 354, 359, 585 P.2d 173, 177 (1978).
31. Tuckson v. State, 364 A.2d 138, 140 (D.C. 1976); State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514,
548, 220 S.E.2d 495, 518 (1975), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977).
32. People v. Salazar, 74 Cal. App. 3d at 888, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 761; State v. Fritz, 21
Wash. App. at 359, 585 P.2d at 177.
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one of the essentials of a fair trial.33 This apparent adoption of the
Schneckloth rationale is indicative of a post-Faretta attitude not to
expand or liberalize the narrow holding that criminal defendants
have a right of self-representation.
B. Retroactivity
Neither the majority nor minority opinions in Faretta mention
whether this newly articulated constitutional right to self-repre-
sentation should be applied retroactively. 34 Even after Faretta, it
would not be an appealable issue if the pre-Faretta defendant had
not specifically attempted to appear pro se and had been denied.3 5
Only two Faretta commentators have discussed the issue, both
concluding that the right should not be retroactive because the ra-
tionale of the right is personal freedom rather than the enhance-
ment of the reliability of the truth-determining or fact-finding
process. 36
The post-Faretta cases, consistent with the position not to ex-
pand the right, have tended to support the proposition that the
right of self-representation is not retroactive and thus will be appli-
cable only to trials commencing after June 30, 1975: the date of the
Faretta decision.37 The leading case is People v. McDaniel,38
which applied the threefold test of Stovall v. Denno39 to determine
whether or not a decision should be applied retroactively or pro-
spectively. These three criteria are: (1) the purpose of the new
rule; (2) the degree of reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect
retroactive application would have on the administration of jus-
tice.40
The determination of whether a rule is to be given retroactive application
is generally made pursuant to a balancing process, wherein the gain to be
achieved in the administration of justice by accomplishment of the pur-
pose of the new rule [the first criterion] is balanced against the adverse
33. People v. Salazar, 74 Cal. App. 3d at 888, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
34. In earlier retroactive controversies, an essential distinction made was
whether the right enhanced the reliability of the truth-determining process.
See Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and the Prob-
lem of Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L.J. 381 (1974).
35. Dugger v. State, 543 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
36. Schwab, supra note 7, at 2-3; Note, CORNELL L. REV., supra note 7, at 1041-44.
37. People v. McDaniel, 16 Cal. 3d 156, 168, 545 P.2d 843, 850, 127 Cal. Rptr. 467, 474,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1976). Accord, Martin v. Wyrick, 568 F.2d 583, 588
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1623 (1978); Houston v. Nelson, 404 F. Supp.
1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Scott v. State, 345 So. 2d 414, 417 (Fla. App.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977). Contra, Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886,
890 (5th Cir. 1977); People v. Holcomb, 395 Mich. 326, 336 n.7, 235 N.W.2d 343,
347 n.7 (1975).
38. 16 Cal. 3d 156, 545 P.2d 843, 127 Cal. Rptr. 467, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1976).
39. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
40. Id. at 297.
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effects on the administration of justice resulting from the extent to which
the courts have mistakenly but in good faith relied on the prevailing rule
[the second criterion] and from an application of the new rule for the pur-
pose of reconsidering determinations already finally made pursuant to the
then prevailing rule [the third criterion]. 41
The major considerations of the McDaniel court were that
Faretta did nothing to enhance the reliability of the fact-finding or
truth-determining processes, while the adverse effect on the crimi-
nal justice system would be extremely burdensome.42 The court's
analysis seems persuasive, and other jurisdictions have employed
the same analysis.43
The Michigan case of People v. Holcomb,44 however, held that
the right to appear pro se is to be applied retroactively.45 In its
analysis, the Holcomb majority cited the prior Supreme Court de-
cisions giving retroactive treatment to the right to representation
by counsel on grounds that it affected the integrity and reliability
of the fact-finding process. It stated that there was "no reason" to
treat the pro se right differently, because representation either
way, "affects the truth and accuracy of the guilt-determining proc-
ess."4 6 It would appear that this analysis ignores the distinction
between improving the reliability of the system and merely affect-
ing it, particularly in light of the burden a retroactive rule would
impose.
A strong dissenting opinion did analyze the retroactivity issue
in a manner similar to the one used later by the McDaniel court,
and concluded that Faretta should not be applied retroactively.47
The Fifth Circuit, in effect, applied Faretta retroactively in Chap-
man v. United States,4 8 but did so on the ground that the right of
self-representation had been recognized in the Fifth Circuit prior
to Faretta.49
C. Time and Manner of Asserting the Right
It was noted by Justice Blackmun that one of the procedural
issues left open by the majority opinion in Faretta was how early
in the proceedings the defendant must elect to proceed with coun-
41. People v. McDaniel, 16 Cal. 3d at 166, 545 P.2d at 848, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
42. Id. at 167-68, 545 P.2d at 849-50, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 473-74.
43. Martin v. Wyrick, 568 F.2d 583, 588 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1623 (1978);
Houston v. Nelson, 404 F. Supp. 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Scott v. State, 345
So. 2d 414, 417 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977).
44. 395 Mich. 326, 235 N.W.2d 343 (1975).
45. Id. at 336 n.7, 235 N.W.2d at 347 n.7.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 344-45, 235 N.W.2d at 351-52 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
48. 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977).
49. Id. at 890.
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sel or to appear pro se, and whether a defendant could change his
mind in mid-trial.5 0 The potential abuses and difficulties of being
able to assert the right of self-representation (and possibly obtain
a continuance for preparation) at any stage of the proceedings
should be obvious and the courts have consistently refused to al-
low criminal defendants to manipulate the system in this way. In
State v. Fritz,5 1 a defendant avoided his first trial date by fleeing
the state; on his second scheduled trial date he successfully gained
permission for substitute counsel and a continuance. Finally, on
his third trial date he asserted a right to self-representation in an
obvious attempt to further delay the trial.5 2 Not surprisingly the
trial court refused the request. A general rule has developed that
for the right to be guaranteed, the request for pro se representa-
tion must be timely-that is, it must be asserted before the trial
begins-and allowing a request made on or after the date of trial is
discretionary on the part of the trial court.53
To protect the sincere pro se request, another rule has devel-
oped, namely, that refusal of a timely request is erroneous as a
matter of law and per se reversible. 54 This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that trial courts normally refuse requests for self-representa-
tion made on the day of trial or later. On the contrary, they are
usually granted so long as there is no resulting delay.55 One court
suggested that courts should balance any potential delay or dis-
ruption against such factors as the defendant's reason for request-
ing pro se status, whether the defendant has shown a prior
proclivity to substitute counsel or otherwise delay, and the quality
of representation by the defendant's present counsel.56 Thus, on
occasion a trial court has been reversed for refusal to grant a con-
tinuance for preparation when a pro se choice was legitimately
50. 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. 21 Wash. App. 354, 585 P.2d 173 (1978).
52. Id. at 361, 585 P.2d at 180.
53. Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Mal-
izia, 437 F. Supp. 952, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1298 (1st Cir. 1978);
State v. Strickland, 27 Ariz. App. 695, -, 558 P.2d 723, 726 (1977); People v.
Windham, 19 Cal. 3d 121, 124, 560 P.2d 1187, 1189, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 10, cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 848, rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 961 (1977); Swinehart v. State,
376 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind. 1978); Schnepp v. State, 92 Nev. 557, 560, 554 P.2d 1122,
1124 (1976); State v. Fritz, 21 Wash. App. 354, 361, 585 P.2d 173, 178 (1978).
54. See notes 208-15 & accompanying text infra.
55. See, e.g. German v. State, 373 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ind. 1978); Irvin v. State, 584
P.2d 1068, 1073 (Wyo. 1978). Both cases allowed defendant to dismiss his at-
torney on the first day of trial and proceed pro se, but refused to grant a con-
tinuance for additional preparation. The problem of delay to the courts
versus fairness to the defendant is a difficult balance to strike, as indicated by
the problem of the Hobson's Choice discussed at notes 106-17 & accompany-
ing text infra.
56. Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976).
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made on the first day scheduled for trial.5 7
A clear and precise request for self-representation must be
made. It would be an intolerable situation if a defendant could
vaguely make some comment about wanting to represent himself
or wanting a different attorney at some point in the trial, yet there-
after continue through the trial represented by his attorney, and
then on appeal gain a reversal on the ground that he was denied
his constitutional right of self-representation. Consequently, it has
been held that to be reversible on appeal there must be a clear and
unequivocal demand for self-representation. 58 However, it has
also been held that even where the demand for self-representation
was unequivocally asserted it may be waived by the defendant's
subsequent words or conduct in acquiesing in representation by
an attorney.59 An Indiana court held that a potentially wrongful
denial of an unequivocal request for self-representation was ren-
dered moot for appeal when the defendant filed a later motion
which included a request for counsel.60 Each of these decisions is
consistent with a post-Faretta tendency to interpret the right of
self-representation narrowly and not allow it to become a vehicle
for manipulation or second-guessing.
D. Termination of Pro Se Status
The Faretta majority indicated that pro se status could be ter-
minated if the defendant "deliberately engages in serious and ob-
structionist misconduct. ' 61 There are surprisirgly few cases on
this point, but those that exist clearly establish that it is within the
trial court's discretion to terminate the right of self-representation
57. Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46, 57, 353 N.E.2d 732, 739 (1976). In
Cavanaugh the appointed attorney had petitioned the court that he was not
ready to proceed, but was denied a continuance. This is why the defendant
requested a different attorney, and then went pro se when that request was
denied. Id. A dissenting opinion in Ash v. State, 555 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 842 (1977), argued that it was reversible error not to
grant a continuance when defendant changed his mind and requested to be
represented by counsel. The dissenting justice condemned the majority for
their overriding concern for the convenience to the trial court. Id. at 229-31
(McLintock, J., dissenting).
58. Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bennet, 539 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976); People v.
Potter, 77 Cal. App. 3d 45, 50, 143 Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 (1978); Anderson v. State,
370 N.E.2d 318, 320 (Ind. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1079 (1978); Dugger v.
State, 543 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); State v. Fritz, 21 Wash. App.
354, 360, 585 P.2d 173, 177 (1978).
59. United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 908 (1976).
60. Dorsey v. State, 357 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ind. App. 1976).
61. Faretta v. California 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
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for a defendant who engages in disruptive or delaying tactics. 62
This discretionary power is essential to prevent the right to self-
representation from becoming a right to disrupt the judicial proc-
ess. Two post-Faretta cases have stated in dicta, that a court
which is faced with a defendant who is disruptive from the begin-
ning may use the disruptive behavior as a reason for denying self-
representation. 63 However, in Ferrel v. Superior Court,64 it was
held that a court cannot terminate a defendant's right of self-repre-
sentation on account of pre-trial out-of-court abuses of his pro se
privileges. The court indicated that self-representation could only
be terminated for in-court abuses. 65 This seems to reflect a high
commitment to preserving and protecting the right of self-repre-
sentation, even at the expense of some inconvenience or annoy-
ance to detainment facility personnel.
The termination issue has arisen in other contexts as well. A.
dissenting opinion in People v. Reason66 argued that a court should
be able to terminate the pro se status if during the trial it becomes
apparent that the defendant is not mentally competent to conduct
a defense. 67 This is precisely what happened in State v. Doss,68
where the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court in rescinding permission to proceed pro se when later psy-
chiatric testimony indicated that the defendant was mentally in-
competent to make such a decision.69 Furthermore, it has also
been held that pro se status can be effectively terminated by the
defendant's acquiescence in representation by an attorney.7 0
62. People v. Brownlee, 74 Cal. App. 3d 921, 932, 141 Cal. Rptr. 685, 691 (1977);
Payne v. State, 367 A.2d 1010, 1017 (Del. 1976); People v. Heidelberg, 33 Ill.
App. 3d 574, 593, 338 N.E.2d 56, 71 (1975).
63. People v. Manson, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1, 50, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275, 303 (1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978) (Hinman/Shea murders); People v. Longuemire,
77 Mich. App. 17, 20, 257 N.W.2d 273, 274 (1977).
64. 20 Cal. 3d 888, 576 P.2d 93, 144 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1978).
65. Id. at 891, 576 P.2d at 95, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
66. 37 N.Y.2d 351, 334 N.E.2d 572, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1975).
67. Id. at 359, 334 N.E.2d at 577, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21 (Jasen, J., dissenting). The
majority in Reason upheld the granting of pro se status to a defendant who
had previously been institutionalized, and refused to reverse the conviction
despite the fact that the defendant drifted off into irrelevant and incoherent
ramblings in both his opening and closing statements. Id. at 353-54, 334
N.E.2d at 573-74, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 615-16.
68. 116 Ariz. 156, 568 P.2d 1054 (1977).
69. Id. at 160, 568 P.2d at 1058.
70. United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 908 (1976); State v. Armstrong, 562 P.2d 1129, 1131-32 (Mont.), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 912 (1977); State v. Kirby, 198 Neb. 646, 648, 254 N.W.2d 424, 425 (1977).
See note 159 & accompanying text infra.
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IV. DEFINING THE RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
THROUGH RESOLUTION OF SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES
The Faretta Court also failed to articulate the parameters of the
newly proclaimed constitutional right of self-representation. As
with the procedural decisions, the substantive rulings by appellate
courts have shown a prediliction to not expand the right of self-
representation beyond the bounds of the Faretta decision. How-
ever, there has been a consistent and praiseworthy effort by the
courts to protect the right of self-representation when timely as-
serted by the sincere criminal defendant. Balanced against this is
a consistent determination on the courts' part of not allowing the
right to become a manipulative device for opportunistic defend-
ants.
A. What Constitutes a "Knowing and Intelligent" Waiver of the Right
to Counsel
In order to assert the right of self-representation, there must
first be a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel:
[Iun order to represent himself, the accused must knowingly and intelli-
gently forego those relinquished benefits .... Although a defendant
need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order compe-
tently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open.
... The record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, compe-
tent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his in-
formed free will.... We need make no assessment of how well or poorly
Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California
code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire.
For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assess-
ment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.
71
The Faretta Court was stating, and subsequent cases have con-
curred, that lack of legal knowledge (with its inherent implication
as to whether the decision is wise or intelligent) is irrelevant to a
determination of whether a defendant has knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his right to counsel.72 The focus, instead, has been
and must be on three other factors: first, whether the defendant
was sufficiently informed by the court about the dangers and dis-
advantages of pro se representation;73 second, whether the defend-
71. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835-36 (citations & footnotes omitted).
72. People v. Freeman, 76 Cal. App. 3d 302, 307, 142 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (1977);
Barnes v. State, 258 Ark. 565, 570, 528 S.W.2d 370, 374 (1975).
73. See, e.g. United States v. Pavich, 568 F.2d 33, 38 (7th Cir. 1978); State v. Cun-
ningham, 222 Kan. 704, 706, 567 P.2d 879, 882 (1977). There has been a minor
split over whether this includes the requirement that defendant must specifi-
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ant was told of the advantages of representation by counsel, and
that counsel would be provided free should he be found unable to
pay the expense himself;7 4 and third, whether the defendant was
competent to make such a decision even after having been so in-
formed.75
Both of the dissenting opinions in Faretta76 and several com-
mentators77 have noted that the Court was opening the door to a
judicial quagmire over what does and does not constitute a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. The only "rule"
that begins to emerge from the plethora of post-Faretta cases is:
get something in the record.
Numerous cases have upheld the grant of self-representation
where the appellate court found sufficient evidence in the record to
support a finding that the waiver of right to counsel was made
knowingly and intelligently.7 8 Moreover, a multitude of cases have
been reversed on appeal when the trial courts allowed defendants
to proceed pro se without providing similar proof in the record.7 9
cally be told the charges and possible penalties facing him. Compare State v.
Hartman, 134 Vt. 64, 66-67, 349 A.2d 223, 225 (1975) with People v. Heath, 35 Ill.
App. 3d 880, 88687, 342 N.E.2d 452, 456 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1976); State v. Dan-
iels, 2 Kan. App. 2d 603, 586 P.2d 50 (1978).
75. See, e.g., State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160, 568 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1977); People v.
Salas, 77 Cal. App. 3d 600, 604-05, 143 Cal. Rptr. 755, 758 (1978).
76. 422 U.S. at 845-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
77. See, e.g., Note, Mo. L. REV., supra note 7, at 436-37; Note, S. ILL. U. L.J., supra
note 7, at 280; Note, U. Prrr. L. REV., supra note 7, at 410.
78. United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
919 (1978) (husband); United States v. Pavich, 568 F.2d 33, 38 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Pinky, 548 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 1977); Konigsberg v. Vin-
cent, 526 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 937 (1976); Stepp v.
Estelle, 524 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. Zatko, 80 Cal. App. 3d 534,
543, 145 Cal. Rptr. 643, 648 (1978); People v. Dale, 78 Cal. App. 3d 722, 730, 144
Cal. Rptr. 338, 342, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 327 (1978); People v. Smith, 33 111.
App. 3d 725, 727, 338 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1975); State v. Cunningham, 222 Kan. 704,
706, 567 P.2d 879, 882 (1977); Commonwealth v. Flowers, 365 N.E.2d 839, 845
(Mass. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978); People v. Reason, 37
N.Y.2d 351, 354, 334 N.E.2d 572, 574, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (1975); Irvin v. State,
584 P.2d 1068, 1072 (Wyo. 1978).
79. United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
919 (1978) (wife); Ford v. Wainwright, 526 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1976); Marti-
nez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1975); O'Dell v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 576 P.2d 104, 108 (Alaska 1978); People v. Lopez, 71 Cal. App. 3d
568, 572, 138 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38 (1977); Wallace v. State, 361 N.E.2d 159, 161 (Ind.
App. 1977); State v. Daniels, 2 Kan. App. 2d 603, 586 P.2d 50 (1978); State v.
Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 264, 347 A.2d 219, 224 (1975); Hamilton v. State, 30 Md.
App. 202, 206, 351 A.2d 153, 154 (1976); Cason v. State, 31 Md. App. 121, 125, 354
A.2d 840,843 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46,57,353 N.E.2d
732,739 (1976); State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 193-94, 368 N.E.2d 1278, 1281
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The opposite situations have also occurred. Several cases have re-
versed trial courts for denying the right of self-representation
when the appellate court found sufficient evidence that the waiver
was made knowingly and intelligently,80 while other cases have af-
firmed trial court denials of self-representation when the appellate
court agreed that the record showed there was not a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. 81 -Also, both federal and
state courts have on occasion remanded cases for a determination
whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of right to
counsel when the appellate court could not make such a determi-
nation from the record.82
The fact that the cases have gone five different ways with re-
spect to the "knowing and intelligent waiver" issue seems to indi-
cate that ultimately each case must rest upon its particular set of
facts.83 Nevertheless, the common theme of the cases is a consis-
tent attempt to protect and defend the right of self-representation
in principle, 84 while refusing to allow the waiver issue to become a
manipulative device.
(1977); Thomas v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); State v.
Hartman, 134 Vt. 64, 66-67, 349 A.2d 223, 225 (1975).
80. Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. State,
258 Ark. 565, 572, 528 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1975); People v. Freeman, 76 Cal. App. 3d
302, 309-10, 142 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1978); People v. Tyner, 76 Cal. App. 3d 352,
355, 143 Cal. Rptr. 52,53 (1977); Thomas v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1054,
1058-59, 126 Cal. Rptr. 830, 832-33 (1976); People v. Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 371,
247 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1976) (second defendant); Cole v. State, 569 P.2d 470, 472
(Okla. Crim. 1977).
81. State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160, 568 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1977); People v. Salas, 77
Cal. App. 3d 600, 605, 143 Cal. Rptr. 755, 758 (1978); People v. Manson, 71 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 50-51, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275, 303 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978)
(Hinman/Shea murders); People v. Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 369, 247 N.W.2d
857, 860 (1976) (first defendant); Commonwealth v. Glover, 247 Pa. Super. Ct.
465, 468, 372 A.2d 919, 921 (1977).
82. Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 277 (lst Cir. 1976); People v. Holcomb, 395
Mich. 326, 336, 235 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1975); State v. Garcia, 21 Wash. App. 58,-,
583 P.2d 1253, 1257 (1978).
83. For example, in United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 919 (1978), it was held that saying little more than "me too" when
one's co-defendant spouse is extensively questioned as to whether he is mak-
ing a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, does not amount
to a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel by the other de-
fendant. Id. at 1309.
84. However, two state court decisions have totally ignored the issue whether the
waiver of the right to counsel had been knowingly and intelligently made.
People v. Anthony, 42 11. App. 3d 102, 103-04, 355 N.E.2d 680, 681 (1976); Junior
v. State, 91 Nev. 439, 442, 537 P.2d 1204, 1206 (1975). In these two cases, the
state courts upheld trial court decisions which allowed the defendants to rep-
resent themselves without having been given explanations of the dangers or
disadvantages of self-representation. Though both cases cited Faretta it is
difficult to see how either case can be reconciled with that decision.
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Although reference to the trial record is the normal practice for
an appellate court in determining whether there was a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, several courts have
held that the record is not the sole source for such a determination
and that other facts and circumstances may be taken into ac-
count.85 In People v. Anderson,86 it was held that the second de-
fendant's demeanor and statements clearly showed that his waiver
of right to counsel was knowing and intelligent, notwithstanding
the fact that he was not given a full colloquy explanation by the
court.
87
At least one Faretta commentator believes that objective stan-
dards should be established to guide trial courts in determining
whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent.88 Such standards
were attempted in People v. Lopez,89 where a California court of
appeals gave two pages of suggestions on how and what a trial
court should build into its record in order to establish whether the
attempted waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.90 The
above commentator also believes that if the request for pro se sta-
tus is granted, the burden of proof that the waiver was not know-
ingly and intelligently made should fall upon the defendant.9 1 This
position has been expressly adopted by some courts. 92
A significant point of controversy between the courts is whether
a defendant who is competent to stand trial can be deemed incom-
petent to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.
An early post-Faretta decision by the New York Supreme Court,
People v. Reason,93 held that if a defendant is competent to stand
trial, he is also competent to assert his right of self-representa-
tion.94 This holding was made despite the fact that the defendant
had a history of commitment to mental institutions and had drifted
into incoherent and irrelevant discourses during both his opening
85. Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d at 277; Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 134
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 937 (1976); People v. Jackson, 59 Ill. App.
3d 1004, 1008, 376 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1978); People v. Heath, 35 1l1. App. 3d 880, 886-
87, 342 N.E.2d 452, 456 (1976); People v. Smith, 33 IlM. App. 3d 725, 727, 338
N.E.2d 207, 208 (1975); People v. Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 370-71, 247 N.W.2d
857, 861 (1976).
86. 398 Mich. 361, 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976).
87. Id. at 370-71, 247 N.W.2d at 861. There were two defendants in the case. One
was found to have made an adequate waiver and the other not to have done
SO.
88. Note, S. ILT. U. I.J., supra note 7, at 282-83.
89. 71 Cal. App. 3d 568, 138 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977).
90. Id. at 572-74, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 38-40.
91. Note, S. ILL. U. L.J., supra note 7, at 284.
92. Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 277 (lst Cir. 1976); Stepp v. Estelle, 524
F.2d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. 37 N.Y.2d 351, 334 N.E.2d 572, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1975).
94. Id. at 354-55, 334 N.E.2d at 574, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
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and closing statements. 95 The court reasoned that it would be too
difficult to formulate a workable higher standard that would not
infringe upon the constitutional right of self-representation. 96 The
dissent cited Westbrook v. Arizona97 as evidence that the Supreme
Court had already distinguished the capacity to stand trial from
the capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive a constitutional
rightY8 Despite People v. Reason, several Faretta commentators
suggest that a defendant's incompetence should be grounds for re-
fusing to find a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to coun-
sel,99 and the decisions of other jurisdictions since Reason have
agreed that a defendant can be found to have been incompetent to
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. 0 0
In Martinez v. Thomas,101 a combination of factors, including
clear evidence of extremely low mentality, taken together, indi-
cated a lack of due process to allow the defendant to proceed pro
se.10 2 However, a mere assertion of incompetence is not sufficient
where the court finds other evidence that a defendant is capable of
understanding, and the trial court is not required to make a sepa-
rate psychological exam when it is satisfied that it would be unnec-
essary. 103 In People v. Heidelberg,104 it was held permissible for
95. Id. at 353; 334 N.E.2d at 573; 372 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
96. Id. at 354, 334 N.E.2d at 574, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
97. 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
98. People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d at 357, 334 N.E.2d at 576, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 619
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
99. Note, supra note 3, at 704; Note, AiB. L. REv., supra note 7, at 434; Note, Mo. L.
REv., supra note 7, at 436; Comment, PEPPERDINE L. REV., supra note 7, at 341-
42.
100. State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160, 568 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1977); People v. Salas, 77
Cal. App. 3d 600, 604-05, 143 Cal. Rptr. 755, 758 (1978); People v. Manson, 71 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 50, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275, 303 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978)
(Hinman/Shea murders); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 172, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 265, 306 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977) (Tate/LaBianca
murders); Cason v. State, 31 Md. App. 121, 124, 354 A.2d 840, 843 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Glover, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 465, 467, 372 A.2d 919, 920 (1977). In
People v. Salas one significant factor was that the defendant could neither
read nor write English. 77 Cal. App. 3d at 604, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 757. One com-
mentator suggests that Faretta implied that one minimum requirement for a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is being literate, since
the Court specifically referred to Anthony Faretta as "literate." 422 U.S. at
835. Note, DEPAuL L. REV., supra note 7, at 781.
The original right to counsel case, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
had also stressed the need for counsel when an '"lliterate" defendant was
involved. Id. at 69.
101. 526 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975).
102. Id. at 753-54.
103. People v. Zatko, 80 Cal. App. 3d 534, 543, 145 Cal. Rptr. 643, 648 (1978). The
court affirmatively held that competency to stand trial is a different standard
than competency to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel.
Id. at 541, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
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the trial judge to delay a ruling on the defendant's request for self-
representation until after receiving reports from a psychological
evaluation of the defendant.105
Another controversial issue, and one upon which the jurisdic-
tions are more sharply divided, is whether there is ever a "knowing
and intelligent waiver" of the right to counsel when the defendant
seeks different counsel and the trial court forces the defendant to
make a choice between remaining with the present undesired
counsel or proceeding pro se. Some appellate courts have referred
to this as a "Hobson's Choice," referring to the story of the English
carrier who owned two horses for hire, and who required his cus-
tomers to take the horse that happened to be standing beside the
stable door.106 The problem of the Hobson's Choice is amply dis-
cussed in a recent article, 107 inspired by the case of Irvin v.
State, 0 8 which upheld the lower court's decision to force the de-
fendant to represent himself when he refused to continue with his
court-appointed attorney.109 The obvious distinction should be
whether the defendant has a legitimately expressed reason for de-
siring different counsel, or whether, in the trial court's determina-
tion, the defendant is seeking only to delay or disrupt the
proceedings. A gross example of the unfairness which results
when the distinction is not made is Ford v. Wainwright.11o In
Ford, several days before trial the defendant discovered that his
privately retained attorney had been previously disbarred, and
that the presiding judge was the prosecuting attorney at the dis-
barment. The judge would not grant the defendant's request for a
new attorney despite the fact that one was presented to the court,
and ordered the defendant to proceed with selection of the jury.
The judge subsequently offered to appoint a public defender but
only on the condition that the defendant agree to forfeit his bail.
The judge, nevertheless, then withdrew the bail when the defend-
ant declined the offer."' Although the Fifth Circuit reversed this
conviction on appeal, it is indicative of the deference given the trial
court's discretion.
A typical example of a forced Hobson's Choice is King v.
104. 33 Ill. App. 3d 574, 338 N.E.2d 56 (1975).
105. Id. at 590, 338 N.E.2d at 69.
106. Wright v. State, 32 Md. App. 60, 64 n.2, 359 A.2d 1, 3 n.2 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46, 53, 353 N.E.2d 732, 737 (1976).
107. Comment, Pro Se Defendants and Advisory Counsel, 14 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 227, 242-47 (1979).
108. 584 P.2d 1068 (Wyo. 1978).
109. Id. at 1072.
110. 526 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1976).
111. Id. at 920-22.
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Schubin.112 The appellate court refused to reverse the trial court
for forcing a Hobson's Choice upon the defendant who waited until
after the trial began to demand a delay and different counsel, but
only vaguely alleged a lack of communication as his reason for dis-
satisfaction with an apparently competent appointed attorney.113
Several cases have indicated a reluctance on the part of appellate
courts to overrule a trial court's discretion for forcing a Hobson's
Choice, 114 while noting that others have been more willing to inter-
vene and remand on grounds that such a forced choice is not a
knowing and intelligent waiver."15 The problem is to protect the
right of self-representation without permitting manipulation of the
courts. It would seem that a minimum consideration of fairness
would require trial courts to at least inquire why a defendant is
seeking different counsel before forcing such a choice. However, in
Commonwealth v. Flowers1 6 it was held that, where a second re-
quest for a different attorney was an obvious dilatory tactic, there
was no constitutional obligation to inquire further because it was
clear that there was no substantive objection to the present coun-
sel.17
B. Procedural Rules and the Public Interest in a Fair Trial
The rationale for extending a constitutional right to counsel in
criminal proceedings was to protect the public interest in fair tri-
als.1 8 Even the majority in Faretta conceded that a constitutional
112. 522 F.2d 527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975).
113. Id. at 529.
114. Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976); King v. Schubin, 522
F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975); German v. State, 373
N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ind. 1978); Commonwealth v. Flowers, 365 N.E.2d 839, 845
(Mass. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978); People v. Longuemire, 77
Mich. App. 17, 23, 257 N.W.2d 273, 274 (1977); State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 880,
379 A.2d 813, 822 (1977); Irvin v. State, 84 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Wyo. 1978).
115. Ford v. Wainwright, 526 F.2d 919, 921-22 (5th Cir. 1976); Martinez v. Thomas,
526 F.2d 750, 756 n.8 (2d Cir. 1975); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 267, 347 A.2d
219, 225 (1975); Wright v. State, 32 Md. App. 60, 63-64, 359 A.2d 1, 3 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 13, 57, 353 N.E.2d 732, 739 (1976); Thomas
v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64,68 (Tex. Crim. 1977); State v. Garcia, 21 Wash. App. 58,
-, 583 P.2d 1253, 1257 (1978).
116. 365 N.E.2d 839 (Mass. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978).
117. 365 N.E.2d at 845.
118. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell it was stated
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether an indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
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right to self-representation worked at cross-purposes to the goal of
a fair trial:
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to con-
duct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court's deci-
sions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be
convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the
assistance of counsel . . . . For it is surely true that the basic thesis of
those decisions is that the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the de-
fendant a fair trial.1 19
Nevertheless, the Faretta majority, relying on an equally strong
respect for the right of individual freedom, asserted that it is "quite
another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a
lawyer he does not want.... [A] ithough he may conduct his own
defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be
honored .... "1120
Notwithstanding the above, the Faretta Court stated that self-
representation is not "a license not to comply with the relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law."' 2 1 A knowing and intelli-
gent waiver on the part of a defendant depends on his having been
informed that he must follow the "ground rules" of trial proce-
dure.12 2 Consequently, the appellate courts have generally re-
fused to allow obvious procedural errors to be the grounds for
reversal when the pro se defendant did not enter a timely objec-
tion.123 Likewise, it has been held that a pro se defendant is not
entitled to special favors vis a vis the discovery process. 124 The
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he had a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to es-
tablish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how
much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, of those of feeble
intellect.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 69.
119. 422 U.S. at 832-33 (citations & footnotes omitted).
120. Id. at 833-34.
121. Id. at 835 n.46.
122. Id. at 836.
123. United States v. Pinky, 548 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 1977) (no matter that com-
plex mail fraud was involved); United States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d 635, 637 (10th
Cir. 1977) (introduction of a tape which referred to other past illegal acts);
State v. Cunningham, 222 Kan. 704, 707, 567 P.2d 879, 882 (1977) (prosecutor
misstatements in closing); Miller v. State, 560 P.2d 739, 740 (Wyo. 1977) (jury
instructions that failed to give instructions on the effect of voluntary drunk-
enness upon specific intent).
Apparently the doctrine of plain error would still apply if the appellate
court found plain error (but none here). United States v. Pinky, 548 F.2d at
310; United States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d at 637.
124. State v. Addicks, 34 Or. App. 557, 561, 579 P.2d 289, 291 (1978) held that it was
not error that incarcerated defendant did not inspect or copy material avail-
able in the prosecutor's office. Defendant had an appointed advisory counsel
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defendant is also not entitled to be informed of his right not to in-
criminate himself as he conducts his defense. 25
The trial judge is under no obligation to become the advocate or
assistant for the inept pro se defendant, 2 6 although some courts
attempt in their discretion to provide guidance. Thus, the trial
judge in United States v. Pavich127 told the defendant how to lay a
foundation, impeach a witness, introduce a document into evi-
dence, and advised him how to avoid the elicitation of damaging
evidence. 28 Furthermore, a footnote in Pavich indicates that a
trial judge must exercise special care to protect a pro se defend-
ant's rights in matters of law. This duty would include insuring
adequate jury instructions, even if the defendant did not object. 2 9
Thus far, the majority of the trial courts have not shown an inclina-
tion to treat pro se defendants differently than professional coun-
sel, 30 but there is pre-Faretta precedent for it,131 and at least one
commentator has argued that courts should. 32 The "can't lose"
advantage of such a rule militates against its widespread applica-
tion to reverse trial courts.
On the other hand, some courts seem quite willing to accord
some leniency to the pro se defendant as far as conformity to ap-
who could have done it, and the prosecutor was held under no obligation to
deliver it to the jail.
125. People v. Owens, 66 Cal. App. 3d 720, 722, 136 Cal. Rptr. 215, 216 (1977). De-
fendant had called his accomplice as a witness, whose prior statements to
police contained a statement tending to incriminate the defendant.
126. United States v. Pinky, 548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir. 1977), noted that by choos-
ing to proceed pro se the defendant acquiesced in the rules. "The trial court
is under no obligation to become an 'advocate' for or to assist and guide the
pro se layman through the trial thicket." Id. at 311. Accord, United States v.
Pavich, 568 F.2d 33, 40 (7th Cir. 1978).
127. 568 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1978).
128. Id. at 40. Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Davis, 479 Pa. 274, 283, 388 A.2d 324,
328 (1978), where the pro se defendant faced a possible death sentence, the
court provided advisory counsel and took the defendant aside and carefully
explained the concept of mitigating circumstances to him so that the defend-
ant could raise it in his statement to the jury prior to sentencing.
129. United States v. Pavich, 568 F.2d at 40 n.5. Contra, Miller v. State, 560 P.2d 739,
740 (Wyo. 1977).
130. See notes 125-29 & accompanying text supra.
131. In Martinez v. People, 172 Colo. 82, 470 P.2d 26 (1970), the Colorado Supreme
Court acknowledged that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel. Nevertheless, it reversed a lower court conviction on the
ground that the trial court erred in not providing an instruction on a defense
which, if believed, would have eviscerated an essential element of the crime.
This was the case despite the fact that the defendant did not make an objec-
tion to the instructions. The court reasoned that with no defense attorney
present and an inept defendant, the result was so lacking in due process that
reversal was necessary. Id. at 87, 470 P.2d at 29.
132. Note, ALB. L. REv., supra note 7, at 440-42.
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pellate procedural rules is concerned. In Potts v. Estelle133 the
Fifth Circuit declined to summarily reject a pro se habeas corpus
petition on the ground that it technically failed to allege a neces-
sary element of the indigency, despite the strong urging of the
State of Texas that it do so.'3 4 Similarly, in People v. Heidel-
berg 3 5 the appellate court accepted a late appeal when the pro se
defendant was not informed of the deadline.136
C. Standby or Advisory Counsel
The appointment of a standby or advisory counsel is a device
that helps insure a fair trial, while still respecting the right to self-
representation. Although courts are not always consistent in their
terminology, standby should refer to counsel appointed solely for a
"standby" purpose-ready to take-over if the pro se status is relin-
quished or terminated, but not actually assisting the pro se defend-
ant.13 7 Advisory counsel, in contrast, is appointed with the
additional function of being able to assist the pro se defendant, al-
though the position may vary from an active advisory role, to one
only giving advice when requested to do so by the defendant. 3 8
Although it used the term "standby," the majority opinion in
Faretta recognized a role for both standby and advisory counsel:
Of course, a State may-even over objection by the accused-appoint a
standby counsel to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help,
and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination
of the defendant's self-representation is necessary.
13 9
Likewise, the American Bar Association has recommended that
trial judges appoint standby counsel to assist pro se litigants. 140
133. 529 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1976).
134. Id. at 452. The court noted:
Though it is a close question, we are of the opinion that appellant's
pro se petition could not be dismissed on the basis of an inadequate
allegation of indigency. The standard against which we measure pro
se complaints and petitions is and should be loose enough to accom-
modate the inartful pleader.
Id.
135. 33 Ill. App. 3d 574, 338 N.E.2d 56 (1975).
136. Id. at 579, 338 N.E.2d at 61. The court stressed, however, that it accepted the
appeal in its discretion, and did not thereby establish a precedent.
137. Comment, supra note 107, at 228.
138. Id. at 229-30. A third variation is the hybrid or co-counsel relationship, dis-
cussed at notes 160-68 & accompanying text infra.
139. 422 U.S. at 835 nA6.
140. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 6.7 (1972);
When a defendant has been permitted to proceed without the assist-
ance of counsel, the trial judge should consider the appointment of
standby counsel to assist the defendant when called upon and to call
the judge's attention to matters favorable to the accused upon which
the judge should rule on his own motion.
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Although it would be pointless to list the vast number of post-
Faretta cases that have employed standby or advisory counsel in
one form or another, certain important issues concerning the prac-
tice have emerged. One question, asked by Justice Blackmun in
his dissent, was whether a defendant who has elected self-repre-
sentation has a constitutional right to the assistance of a standby
counsel?14 1 Three Faretta commentators argue that standby or ad-
visory counsel should be available by right.142 However, as
another Faretta commentator notes, an important distinction ex-
ists between a situation where the court wants an advisory or
standby counsel appointed (which is the typical situation), and a
situation where the defendant wants it. 143 Cases which have con-
sidered the issue have held that the pro se defendant cannot, by
right, force a court to appoint standby counsel, but rather such an
appointment has been held to be in the discretion of the court.144
The right of trial courts to restrict or expand the role of standby
or advisory counsel has also been upheld as being in the discretion
of the trial court.145 Moore v. State"4 6 upheld a court directive that
the advisory counsel must remain passive and only confer with the
pro se defendant when requested to do so by the defendant. 147
Moore also illustrates the principle that activity or non-activity by
standby or advisory counsel, when the defendant has knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to counsel, cannot become
grounds for a claim of ineffective representation by advisory coun-
sel.148
As previously noted, the Faretta majority stated that standby
Professor Yale Kamisar made a similar recommendation before the delegates
to the 20th Annual Michigan Judicial Conference. Remarks, 55 MicH. ST. B. J.
335 (1976).
141. 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. Note, AR. L. REV., supra note 7, at 551-53; Note, CAP. U. L. REv., supra note 7,
at 290; Note, HoFsTaA L. REV., supra note 7, at 469-71. The Hofstra article
argued that the fifth amendment's due process requirement, with its implica-
tions for a fair trial, should require a right to appointment of standby counsel.
The Arkansas commentator argued that the Faretta language that "counsel,
like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to
a willing defendant," implies that a willing defendant has a right to standby
counsel. Note, ARK. L. REV., supra note 7, at 551-53 (quoting 422 U.S. at 820).
143. Note, HASTINGs L.J., supra note 7, at 293.
144. United States v. Olson, 576 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 256
(1978); Reliford v. People, 579 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Colo. 1978). As the Olson court
noted, appellate courts routinely approve the appointment of advisory coun-
sel when made in the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Pilla, 550
F.2d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
145. State v. Randall, 530 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Mo. App. 1975).
146. 142 Ga. App. 145, 235 S.E.2d 577 (1977).
147. Id. at 146, 235 S.E.2d at 578.
148. Id. Accord, State v. Randall, 530 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Mo. App. 1975).
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counsel could be appointed even over the objection of the pro se
defendant. 149 Such an appointment was upheld in United States v.
Taylor.15 0 In People v. Heidelburg,151 appointment of standby
counsel as a preventive measure in anticipation of a disruptive pro
se defendant was upheld;152 and in German v. State 53 the appoint-
ment of the standby attorney to take over the case when the de-
fendant became disruptive was approved.154 Conversely, in Chaleff
v. Superior Court, 55 it was held not contempt for a public de-
fender to refuse to continue as advisory counsel where further par-
ticipation would force the attorney to compromise himself under
the California Rules of Professional Conduct. 56
Because of the high public interest in fair trials and in main-
taining the integrity of judicial proceedings, it was held in United
States v. Taylor5 7 that it was not error to allow the advisory attor-
ney to participate in the trial (cross examination of witnesses and
closing statement), where the pro se defendant assumed a posture
of silence and non-participation. 15 8 However, such a course of ac-
tion may lead to unexpected results. Two state courts and the
Tenth Circuit have held that defendants who had asserted a desire
to represent themselves but who later acquiesce in representation
by an attorney thereby waive their right to appear pro se.159
D. Right to Co-Counsel Status
If a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel, as well as a
constitutional right to self-representation, does he have a corre-
sponding constitutional right to both simultaneously? Such a situ-
ation is usually called co-counsel, mixed, or hybrid representation,
149. 422 U.S. at 835 n.46. See note 139 & accompanying text supra.
150. United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952
(1978).
151. 33 Ill. App. 3d 574, 338 N.E.2d 56 (1975).
152. Id. at 592, 338 N.E.2d at 70.
153. 373 N.E.2d 880 (Ind. 1978).
154. 373 N.E.2d at 883.
155. 69 Cal. App. 3d 721, 138 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1977).
156. Id. at 724-25, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 737. The pro se defendant wanted the public
defender to participate in a defense (namely to offer no defense) which was
contrary to the public defender's understanding of and commitment to the
California Rules of Professional Conduct governing public defenders. Id. at
725 n.2, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 37 n.2.
157. 569 F.2d 448 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978). See note 150 & accom-
panying text supra.
158. United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d at 451-52.
159. United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 908 (1976); State v. Armstrong, 562 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Mont.), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 912 (1977); State v. Kirby, 198 Neb. 646, 648, 254 N.W.2d 424,425 (1977).
The Montgomery and Armstrong courts both upheld the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to proceed with his closing statement.
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and gives the defendant the advantage of counsel while preserving
his right to decide trial strategy and participate in the trial. One
year before Faretta was decided, the Kentucky Supreme Court
held in Wake v. Barker,160 that under both the federal and Ken-
tucky constitutions, a criminal defendant was entitled to mixed
representation.161
Cases since Faretta, however, have been unanimous in restrict-
ing the right of self-representation to its own terms and in rejecting
the contention that there is a constitutional right to co-counsel sta-
tus implicit in Faretta. Instead, it has been held that a request for
co-counsel status is within the discretion of the trial court,162 the
reasoning being that while there is an independent right to coun-
sel,163 and an independent right to self-representation, 164 the two
are mutually exclusive. 165 A major policy consideration behind
this refusal is a concern for protecting the traditional prerogatives
of counsel,166 and avoiding potential chaos in the smooth function-
ing of a criminal trial.167 Some commentators have argued that the
160. 514 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1974).
161. Id. at 696. The court held that the defendant could specify for which purposes
he wanted the appointed counsel, and that the appointed counsel had to com-
ply. This reversed the trial judge, who had ordered the public defender to
represent the defendant in a way the defendant did not want.
162. United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dunlop, 577 F.2d 867, 869 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 174 (1978); United
States v. Sacco, 571 F.2d 791, 793 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978);
United States v. Bowdach, 561 F. 2d 1160, 1176 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); United
States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 49 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976);
United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894
(1976); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1059 (1976); Goodspeed v. Estelle, 436 F. Supp. 1383, 1391 (N.D. Tex.
1977); United States v. Gaines, 416 F. Supp. 1047, 1051 (N.D. Ind. 1976); United
States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); People v. Harris, 65
Cal. App. 3d 978, 987, 135 Cal. Rptr. 668, 673 (1977); Gibbs v. State, 359 A.2d 164,
166 (Del 1976); People v. Heidelberg, 33 Ill. App. 3d 574, 591, 338 N.E.2d 56, 69
(1975); Swinehart v. State, 376 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind. 1978); State v. Ames, 222
Kan. 88, 100, 563 P.2d 1034, 1044 (1977); Callahan v. State, 30 Md. App. 628, 639-
35, 354 A.2d 191, 194-95 (1976); State v. Burgin, 539 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Mo. App.
1976); State v. McCleary, 149 N.J. Super. Ct. 77, 80, 373 A.2d 400, 401 (1977);
State v. Carter, 53 Ohio App. 2d 125, 128, 372 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1977); Stiner v.
State, 539 P.2d 750,753 (Okla. Crim. 1975); Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272,280
(Tex. Crim. 1977); Moore v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 285, 300, 265 N.W.2d 540, 546, cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 356 (1978).
163. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
164. 422 U.S. at 807.
165. State v. Ames, 222 Kan. 88, 100, 563 P.2d 1034, 1044 (1977).
166. United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1059 (1976); State v. Pratts, 71 N.J. 399, 400-01, 365 A.2d 928, 929 (1976).
167. See, e.g., Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. Crim. 1977), which de-
scribed the "well known jailhouse lawyer" as a defendant "who would be im-
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right to co-counsel is a necessary implication of Faretta, reasoning
that one constitutional right should not have to be sacrificed in or-
der to exercise another.168 Apparently appellate courts are not
persuaded by this argument.
E. Time to Prepare and Library Access
It has been suggested that minimum time to prepare and access
to materials are fundamental adjuncts to any meaningful right of
self-representation. 169 As to access to legal materials, post-Faretta
decisions have consistently protected the right of self-representa-
tion by guaranteeing some sort of access to materials, although
this has been effectuated in different ways consistent with the type
of prisoners and resources of the detention facility involved. An
Illinois decision coming shortly after Faretta held that there was
no right to law books if the jail did not have a library or other facili-
ties for a pro se prisoner; but the court approved the discretionary
efforts of the trial court in relaxing jail rules, providing a telephone
in the inmate's cell, directing an advisory attorney to furnish
books, and providing special mail and visitor privileges to facilitate
contacting witnesses. 170 The court limited its decision, however, to
the specific facts before it: "In approving this procedure here,
where no previous guidelines existed, we do not intend to estab-
lish any precedent for such requirements."' 17
The right to legal materials was greatly strengthened in Bounds
v. Smith.172 The Supreme Court held that minimum requirements
of access to legal materials for convicted prisoners (by analogy this
should apply to pro se criminal defendants) includes the require-
ment that prison authorities assist in the preparation and filing of
legal papers, and that an adequate law library or assistance from
persons trained in the law be provided. 73 However, faced with a
dangerous inmate who did not have access to a law library, a fed-
eral district court quickly held that Bounds did not guarantee a
possible to work with" should the trial judge have allowed co-counsel status.
Id. at 275. Landers is noted in Note, Hybrid Representation-Defendant's
Right's Not Violated by Denial of His Request to Act as His Own Counsel, 6
AM. J. CRim. L. 230 (1978); Note, Criminal Law--Hybrid Representation, 9
TEx. TECH. L. REV. 323 (1977-78).
168. Chused, supra note 7, at 663-74; Note, ALB. L. REV., supra note 7, at 442-44;
Note, AM. U. L. REV., supra note 7, at 915-19; Note, HOFSTRA L. REV., supra
note 7, at 466; Note, OHIo ST. L.J., supra note 7, at 237-39.
169. Note, HASTInGS L.J., supra note 7, at 299-301; Comment, PEPPERDINE L. REV.,
supra note 7, at 347; Note, S. ILL. U. L.J., supra note 7, at 281.
170. People v. Heidelberg, 33 Ill. App. 3d 574, 591, 338 N.E 2d 56, 70 (1975).
171. Id. at 591, 338 N.E.2d at 70.
172. 430 U.S. 817 (1977). See Potuto, The Right of Prisoner Access: Does Bounds
Have Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207 (1978).
173. Id. at 828.
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right of personal access to legal materials for violent prisoners in a
facility without its own library.174 Instead, the court upheld the
procedure in which an attorney had been appointed as an "assis-
tant," and had been specifically directed to do any research re-
quested by the inmate.175
Another type of litigation involving prisoner rights to legal
materials, of interest to pro se prisoners, is the "prison cases" of
recent years. Such cases involve the consolidation of complaints
attacking the constitutionality of certain prison operations. 176 In
addition to other reforms mandated by these decisions, is the re-
quirement that each prison establish a law library or other facility
available to prisoners for legal research and the preparation of le-
gal documents. 177 The application of each decision was limited, of
course, to the particular prison involved in the case.
In 1977, the Colorado Supreme Court considered a writ of prohi-
bition from an inmate (apparently non-dangerous with no advisory
counsel involved) seeking to force prison officials to allow him ac-
cess to the prison library. 78 Citing Bounds, the court held that
when a prison has its own law library, a prisoner has a right of
access to that law library to prepare materials for pro se proceed-
ings and motions.179 However, in the following year the Colorado
Court of Appeals, citing the Bounds language that the right to
make a defense includes "access to law libraries or alternative
sources of legal knowledge,"'1 98 held that where standby counsel
was available "to provide secretarial assistance and provide...
legal materials if requested,"'18 that was sufficient.
California apparently adheres to the belief that "regular" pro se
privileges include access to the jail law library five times per week,
three phone calls per day, and availability of a legal runner.18 2 One
California court terminated the right of self-representation for an
174. United States v. West, 557 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1977).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978); Owens-El v. Robinson, 442
F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582
(D.P.R. 1976), affd, 551 F.2d 877 (lst Cir. 1977).
177. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d at 133; Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. at 1387;
Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez. 409 F. Supp. at 584. In response to the argu-
ment that pro se prisoners had torn up books and abused what had been
made available, the Owen-El court observed that the solution lay in better
supervision not denial of basic prisoner rights. 442 F. Supp. at 1387.
178. Hernandez v. District Court, 568 P.2d 1168, 1168 (Colo. 1977).
179. 568 P.2d at 1168.
180. People v. Rice, 579 P.2d 647, 650 (Colo. App.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 261 (1978).
181. 579 P.2d at 650.
182. People v. Harris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 978, 986 n.3, 135 Cal. Rptr. 668, 672-73 n.3
(1977). The privileges are also cited in Ferrel v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 888,
890 n.2, 576 P.2d 93, 94 n.2, 144 Cal. Rptr. 610, 611 n.2 (1978).
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inmate still awaiting trial because of his out-of-court abuses of his
pro se privileges. 183 The state high court reversed, holding that the
right of self-representation cannot be terminated due to pre-trial
out-of-court abuses of privileges.184 However, it was suggested to
the trial court that although the right to self-representation was
protected, the pro se privileges associated with it could be limited
or suspended for such abuses, and the pro se defendant could still
proceed without counsel if informed of the additional disadvan-
tages. 85
A unilateral restriction on the pro se privileges of an inmate
awaiting trial, again involving the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, was challenged in Wilson v. Superior Court.18 6 In Wilson,
the sheriff had sharply limited the petitioner's phone privileges
and contacts with an investigator following a "fracas" in the jail,
apparently unrelated to actual use of pro se privileges. The pris-
oner was denied personal access to the prison law library but
could receive four books each morning and four each afternoon in
his cell. The Superior Court refused to grant petitioner a hearing
when he sought reinstatement of his pro se privileges. 187 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court expressly declined to decide the case on the
basis of a constitutional right of pre-trial detainees to pro se privi-
leges. Instead, the decision was confined to the narrow fact situa-
tion involved, where the superior court had established a written
policy memorandum clearly delineating the pro se privileges avail-
able to prisoners seeking to represent themselves. It was held that
when a policy memorandum of the court gives prisoners preparing
for trial a "reasonable expectation" of pro se privileges, such privi-
leges are protected due process guarantees and cannot be limited
or terminated without notice and hearing except in emergency sit-
uations.188
How courts will grapple with the problems of access to legal
materials by incarcerated pro se defendants in the future is uncer-
tain. Presumably, those free on bond have access to public facili-
ties, although no one seems to have discussed whether assistance
is owed them for even minimal legal research, let alone prepara-
tion of a complete case. An obvious distinction exists between the
incarcerated pro se defendant still awaiting trial and the convicted
prisoner seeking subsequent relief. Bounds v. Smith mandates
183. Ferrel v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 891 n.3, 576 P.2d at 95 n.3, 144 Cal. Rptr.
at 612 n.3. Specifically the detainee had broken a telephone and used his le-
gal runner to pass $440 obtained through illegal gambling.
184. Id. at 891, 576 P.2d at 95, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
185. Id. at 892, 576 P.2d at 95, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
186. 21 Cal. 3d 816, 582 P.2d 117, 148 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1978).
187. Id. at 820-21, 582 P.2d 120-21, 148 Cal. Rptr. 33-34.
188. Id. at 821-22, 582 P.2d at 121, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
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minimum protection for the latter, while the rights of the former
are still in the hands of an ambiguous and developing case law.
Considerations for the safety of others and avoiding potential
abuses by opportunistic inmates mandate limitations on such
rights.
The question of how much time should be given to a pro se de-
fendant to allow for preparation has not been extensively litigated.
Obviously, time is one thing the convicted prisoner has an abun-
dance of, and something that a pro se defendant, who asserted his
desire for self-representation early in the proceedings, would have
by right. However, a different situation occurs when the criminal
defendant asserts his right to appear pro se later on, and couples it
with a motion for a continuance.189 The American rule on granting
continuances has long been that it is in the discretion of the trial
courts.190 The same standard has been applied by state courts in
refusing to reverse convictions of criminal defendants who, on the
first day of trial, requested and received permission to proceed
without their appointed counsel, but were denied a continuance. 19 '
The rationale is that only by allowing discretion can the trial courts
control dilatory tactics by defendants who appear to accept court
appointed counsel, only to fire them at the last minute in an effort
to delay trial. 192
F. A Constitutional Right to Commit Suicide?
Faretta, which involved a defendant charged with grand theft,
broadly held that a defendant in a state criminal case had a consti-
tutional right to self-representation. 93 Assuming the defendant is
not disqualified for other reasons, 194 nothing in Faretta would pre-
clude a defendant facing the death penalty from waiving his right
to counsel and proceeding pro se to execution.195 Although the
189. See notes 67-74 & accompanying text supra (time for asserting the right);
notes 123-34 & accompanying text supra (Hobson's Choice), for discussion of
related problems.
190. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).
191. German v. State, 373 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ind. 1978); Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068,
1073 (Wyo. 1978).
192. Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d at 1074.
193. 422 U.S. at 807.
194. For example, untimely request, incapacity to make a knowing and intelligent
waiver, later termination due to disruptions are all reasons for disqualifica-
tion.
195. But see note 226 & accompanying text infra, for the rule that the right of self-
representation does not carry to the appellate level. Presumably no appellate
court would, in its discretion, allow a pro se defendant to argue such a case on
appeal.
In Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr.
650 (1976), the California Supreme Court did not reach the question whether
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Gary Gilmore approach of "[1] et's do it"196 may strike some as suf-
ficient reason to permit such an eventuality, it would seem that the
integrity of the judicial system demands more than homilies con-
cerning individual freedom when the ultimate penalty of predeter-
mined death may potentially be imposed. Thus far, however, there
is an indication that even in a case involving a capital offense the
right of self-representation will be honored.
In Thomas v. Superior Court, 1 9 7 the trial judge ruled as a matter
of law that there was no right to appear without counsel when the
defendant is accused of a capital offense.198 Prior to trial, the de-
fendant brought a mandate to the California Appellate Court,
seeking a review of the trial court's denial of an allegedly knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. The appellate court
reversed the trial court and held that even where a capital offense
is involved, a defendant has a constitutional right to appear with-
out counsel when he knowingly and intelligently chooses to do
so. 199 Because this appeal came prior to trial, any procedural
requirements to insure a fair trial in such a situation were not dis-
cussed. Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Common-
wealth v. Davis,20 0 held that when there is clearly a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in a capital case, the trial
court must grant self-representation, since to do otherwise would
bring an automatic reversal under Faretta.201 The court stated
that defendant's rights had been adequately protected by the ap-
pointment of an advisory counsel to assist by offering sugges-
tions. 20 2 However, Davis did not involve a capital offense, since
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court just prior to Davis had invali-
dated the Pennsylvania sentencing statute involved. As a result
the court ordered the sentence changed to life imprisonment. 203
the section of the California death penalty statute which sets forth rules con-
cerning representation by counsel when the death penalty is possible would
still be constitutional in light of Faretta. Id. at 442 n.14, 556 P.2d at 114 n.14,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
196. TiME, Jan. 31, 1977, at 48. These were the final words of convicted murderer
Gary Gilmore to the warden and four selected friends present for his execu-
tion. Gilmore had demanded execution and was obliged by a Utah firing
squad on January 17, 1977. Id.
197. 54 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 126 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976).
198. Id. at 1056, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
199. Id. at 1058, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
200. 479 Pa. 274, 388 A.2d 324 (1978).
201. Id. at 283, 388 A.2d at 328. See notes 208-15 & accompanying text infra, for
discussion of the effect of wrongful denial.
202. Commonwealth v. Davis, 479 Pa. at 283, 388 A.2d at 328. The court also held
that defendant could not make a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
where the public defender only offered advice and was not allowed to partici-
pate in trial activities. Id. at 283, 388 A.2d at 328.
203. Id. at 283, 388 A.2d at 329.
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Although there is no precedent for it, one might suggest that in
cases involving a capital offense, where defendant adamantly in-
sists upon his right to appear pro se and the waiver of counsel is
clearly knowing and intelligent, the court should be required as a
matter of law to appoint an advisory counsel, even over defend-
ant's objection. Alternatively, the court should be required as a
matter of law to appoint the pro se defendant and the advisory as
"co-counsel" when the pro se defendant will agree to it. This view
is advocated because of the compelling state interest in fairness
and certainty where a death sentence may be involved, and it
should override the legitimate but lesser concern about potential
manipulation by a criminal defendant.
G. The Shackled Defendant
In Lucero v. Lundquist,20 4 a pro se defendant appearing at a
hearing for the disqualification of the scheduled trial judge, was at
all times handcuffed, and in leg irons and belly chain. This total
restraint made it impossible for him to write or use his hands to
locate the papers he had with him in a file.20 5 In ordering a new
hearing, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a pro se defendant
can only be restrained to the extent needed to insure the safety of
court personnel or others present. It was ordered that he be able
to appear without handcuffs, and only under such other restraints
as necessary for security.206 This decision reflects a consistent ap-
proach by appellate courts to protect the right of self-representa-
tion once it has been asserted, while limiting it as is necessary to
protect the safety and property of judicial or detention facility per-
sonnel.207
H. Effect of Wrongful Denial
In his dissent in Faretta, Justice Blackmun posed the question
whether the wrongful denial of a pro se request would ever be
harmless error (and thus not cause for reversal).208 Faretta would
seem to supply the answer, since the majority acknowledged that
Anthony Faretta was not knowledgeable of the law and would di-
minish his chances if he represented himself, yet reversed the
lower courts and remanded for a new trial.209 The courts which
204. 580 P.2d 1245 (Colo. 1978).
205. 580 P.2d at 1246.
206. Id.
207. See notes 169-90 & accompanying text supra.
208. 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 834-36. An interesting point mentioned by one commentator is that on
remand the prosecutor dropped the charges, the case was dismissed, and
Anthony Faretta went free. Note, DET. C. L. REv., supra note 7, at 357 (citing
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have considered this issue have reversed for incorrect denial of the
right of self-representation.2 10 Two cases expressly held that such
wrongful denial is reversible error per se.2 11 Another case stated
that because a constitutional right is involved, the harmless error
doctrine is not relevant.212 The only contrary indication to this
rule is found in the dicta of the Nebraska Supreme Court in State
v. Kirby.213 The court held that there was no denial of the right of
self-representation where the facts tended to show that defendant
fully acquiesed to representation by his appointed counsel.2 14 The
court went on to state that the defendant was not prejudiced by
counsel or by the denial of self-representation, and that "[t] his
court will not reverse a criminal conviction in absence of prejudice
to the defendant. '215 It is difficult to see how this language can be
reconciled with the Faretta decision, since its practical effect
would be to limit the right of self-representation whenever a trial
judge might decide to deny it. This is inconsistent with the clear
trend in other jurisdictions to jealously protect the right of self-
representation when timely asserted in a knowing and intelligent
manner.
I. Subsequent Claim of Ineffective Counsel
Because few pro se defendants are apt to be skillful enough to
competently conduct a trial, and because self-representation can
easily be obtained through a knowing and intelligent waiver of
one's constitutional right to counsel, the Faretta court took pains
to note that: "[w]hatever else may or may not be open to him on
appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot there-
after complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a
denial of 'effective assistance of counsel.' "216 Despite the Court's
Order of Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No.
A012485, October 1, 1975).
210. Barnes v. State, 258 Ark. 565, 572, 528 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1975); People v. Ander-
son, 398 Mich. 361, 371, 247 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1976).
211. People v. Freeman, 76 Cal. App. 3d 302, 310, 142 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1978); Peo-
ple v. Tyner, 76 Cal. App. 3d 352, 356, 143 Cal. Rptr. 52, 54 (1977).
212. Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1977). Two Commenta-
tors agree that harmless error should not apply and reversal should be auto-
matic. Note, ALB. L. REV., supra note 7, at 436-37; Note, J. URB. L., supra note
7, at 345. Another commentator suggests a possible exception in the situation
of co-defendants, where sufficient identity of interest existed, and the other
co-defendant had been represented by counsel. Comment, COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REV., supra note 7, at 570.
213. 198 Neb. 646, 254 N.W.2d 424 (1977).
214. Id. at 648, 254 N.W.2d at 425.
215. Id. at 648, 254 N.W.2d at 426.
216. 422 U.S. at 835 n.46. Justice Blackmun seemed to agree that at least this ap-
peal would be waived. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
[Vol. 59:135
PRO SE
express language, some commentators believe the issue might not
be so definite. One commentator cites the possibility that differing
concepts of justice might lead to a split in the circuits.2 17 Another
suggests that the fifth amendment emphasis on due process might
not foreclose such a review.218 A third argues that similar consid-
erations under the sixth and fourteenth amendments might invite
reversal where the defendant's incompetence was so obvious as to
produce a fundamentally unfair trial.2 19 A fourth commentator as-
serts that a case of truly gross overreaching by the prosecutor
might be too difficult for an appellate court to overlook.220
The courts, nevertheless, have thus far universally rejected any
attempt by a pro se defendant who made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of right to counsel to gain reversal on the grounds of ineffec-
tive counsel.22 ' Although it is articulated in different ways, the ra-
tionale behind the rule is the need to prevent pro se defendants
from being able to create a "can't lose" situation, where loss at the
trial level guarantees victory on appeal. A typical example is
United States v. Pavich,222 in which the defendant was so adamant
in the assertion of his right to self-representation that he refused
to accept appointment of standby counsel.223 Because the record
clearly revealed that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right
to counsel was made following an extended colloquy between
bench and defendant fully explaining the dangers and disadvan-
tages, 224 it is easy to see why the appellate court was unsympa-
Burger was not so convinced, however, stating: "It is totally unrealistic, ...
to suggest that an accused will always be held to the consequences of a deci-
sion to conduct his own defense." Id. at 846 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
217. Note, HASTINGs L.J., supra note 7, at 297.
218. Note, Orno ST. L.J., supra note 7, at 239. The author suggested the use of
advisory counsel as the best alternative.
219. Note, Am. J. L. REv., supra note 7, at 934 n.179. The author also suggests in the
alternative that defendants might gain reversal on grounds that the court
erred in allowing defendant to waive his right to counsel. Id. at 935. It is clear
that this has occurred, but on grounds that there was not a knowing and intel-
ligent waiver of the right to counsel rather that on grounds of ineffective
counsel. See also note 79 & accompanying text supra.
220. Comment, PEPPERDiNE L. REv., supra note 7, at 348.
221. United States v. Pavich, 568 F.2d 33, 39 (7th Cir. 1978); Chapman v. United
States, 553 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d 635, 637
(10th Cir. 1977); People v. Harris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 978, 988, 135 Cal. Rptr. 668,
673-74 (1977); Reliford v. People, 579 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Colo. 1978); Moore v.
State, 142 Ga. App. 145, 147, 235 S.E.2d 577, 578 (1977); People v. O'Neal, 62 IMI.
App. 3d 146, 150, 379 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1978); State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio 366, 378, 345
N.E.2d 399,407 (1976); Cummings v. State, 578 P.2d 377, 379 (Okla. Crim. 1978);
State v. Wilson, 563 P.2d 792 (Utah 1977); Miller v. State, 560 P.2d 739, 741
(Wyo. 1977).
222. 568 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1978).
223. Id. at 35.
224. Id. at 35-37.
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thetic to a claim of ineffective counsel.225 Although few people
would want a situation where a questionable prosecution case is
guaranteed victory by an inept pro se defendant, adherence to the
rule of no reversal on grounds of ineffective counsel is essential to
prevent allowing the right of self-representation to become a ma-
nipulative tool.
V. EXTENSIONS OF FARETTA
Narrowed to its facts, Faretta holds only that a criminal defend-
ant has a constitutional right to represent himself at trial after a
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. There have been nu-
merous attempts to extend the rationale of Faretta to other non-
criminal or non-trial situations. There has even been an attempt to
use Faretta as support for demanding the right to representation
by a non-lawyer. 226 Although there have been exceptions, the
courts have generally refused to extend the Faretta rationale to
create pro se rights in other situations. For example, courts have
refused to extend such a right to criminal appeals cases, although
it has been permitted as a discretionary matter.2 27 Likewise an at-
tempt to establish a constitutional right to self-representation in
civil cases at the appellate level has also been rejected. 228
In rejecting an attempt to extend the right of self-representa-
tion the Second Circuit held in Phillips v. Tobin229 that a plaintiff
in a stockholder derivative suit cannot bring the suit in a pro se
capacity, notwithstanding Faretta v. California, or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654230 which allows parties to plead and conduct their own cases
personally in federal courts. 231 A primary reason for rejecting self-
representation in such cases is that the plaintiff sues not on his
own behalf, but on behalf of the corporation.232 Additionally, since
if the plaintiff loses, the state corporation statutes may require the
225. A similar case was United States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1977), where
defendant totally ignored his standby counsel and required him to sit in the
back of the courtroom. Id. at 637.
226. See notes 24145 & accompanying text infra.
227. In re Walker, 56 Cal. App. 3d 225, 229, 128 Cal. Rptr. 291, 293 (1976); Callahan v.
State, 30 Md. App. 628, 633, 354 A.2d 191, 194 (1976); Gilday v. Commonwealth,
369 N.E.2d 716, 717 (Mass. 1977).
228. Murin v. Justices of Supreme Court of Nevada, 415 F. Supp. 1178, 1188 (D.
Nev. 1976). Granting self-representation in civil appeals was held to be solely
in the discretion of the appellate court.
229. 548 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1976).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976). This is the modern equivalent of the provision which
has existed since the 1789 Judiciary Act, and which the Faretta Court cited as
an historical reason for implying a right of self-representation in the sixth
amendment. 422 U.S. at 812-13.
231. Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411-12 (2d Cir. 1976).
232. Id. at 412.
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corporation to indemnify its directors for their defense ex-
penses, 233 the state has an interest in insuring that only qualified
persons be permitted to prosecute such litigation.234
Similarly, it has been held that a prisoner cannot prosecute a
civil class action suit in a pro se capacity in Shaffery v. Winter.235
Because the action was on behalf of all prisoners similarly situated
at a New Jersey prison, the court held that the qualifications and
expertise of petitioner's counsel in a class action was of significant
importance, since any adverse judgment would be binding on the
other prisoners.236 It was also noted that it would be unfair to al-
low the legal rights of others to be represented by a litigant with
inherent restrictions on resources and materials due to his incar-
ceration.
Although Faretta has been unsuccessfully used in attempts to
extend self-representation to civil class actions and derivative
suits, a 1976 New York case did cite Faretta, to overcome the tradi-
tional rule that only an attorney can represent a corporation in
civil litigation.237 The case is of limited utility, however, because it
involved the single-stockholder of a close corporation seeking the
right to appear in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy judge had al-
lowed the individual to appear on his personal bankruptcy peti-
tion, but had dismissed the corporation's petition on ground that a
corporation could only be represented by an attorney.23 8 The dis-
trict court noted the high value placed upon self-representation by
Faretta, and that without allowing this action the corporation had
no other practical means of relief.239 In reversing the trial judge
and permitting the individual to represent his corporation, the dis-
trict court stressed the inherent power of the courts to supervise
the administration of justice, and that the attorney-only rule was
merely a "technicality" where a one-man corporation was con-
cerned.240
Several attempts have been made to extend the implications of
Faretta to other aspects of criminal litigation. One that has been
universally rejected is the attempt to demand a constitutional right
to be represented by a non-lawyer lay person at one's own criminal
233. See, e.g. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (c) (Reissue 1977).
234. Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d at 412.
235. 72 F.R.D. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
236. Id. at 193. However, it was held that the prisoner could litigate his personal
complaints of interference by the prison officials. Id. at 194.
237. In re Holliday's Tax Services, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 182, 183 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
238. Id. at 183.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 184. However, the court also held that the bankruptcy judge could later
require an attorney (upon pain of dismissal) if, in the judge's discretion, he
felt the lay representation threatened disruption of the proceedings.
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trial.241 Many of these lay-representation cases involved "tax
protestors" who were often incensed that their attorneys would re-
fuse to advance their more outlandish interpretations of the consti-
tution as motions to the court.242 Reference was often made to
dictum in the Faretta opinion about representation by friends in
colonial times. 243 One of the more thoughtful refutations of this
argument is found in Turner v. American Bar Association.244 Like-
wise, it has also been held that a lay person cannot use Faretta as
a basis for asserting a constitutional right to represent others in
violation of state bar association licensing rules.245
In Cason v. State,24 6 the right to self-representation was ex-
tended to any probation hearing to which the right to counsel
would also attach.2 47 Two other extensions of Faretta were United
States v. Robertson,248 which held that Faretta implies that a crim-
inal defendant has a right not to allow his court appointed attorney
to enter an insanity defense against his will, where there was clear
evidence that defendant was competent;249 and Judge v. United
States,25 0 which held that a criminal defendant has a right to nego-
241. United States v. Olson, 576 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 256
(1978); United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 952 (1978); United States v. Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461, 466 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Whitesel, 453 F.2d 1176, 1180 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
967, rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977); United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d
1199, 1203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976); United States v. Shimek,
445 F. Supp. 884, 888 (M.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Corrigan, 410 F. Supp.
795, 799 (D. Wyo.), rev'd on other grounds, 548 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1977); Turner
v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 478 (N.D. Tex. 1975), affd sub nom.,
Pilla v. American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976); State v. Dinsmore, 34
Conn. Supp. 674, 676, 388 A.2d 439, 442 (1977).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 919 (1978).
243. 422 U.S. at 820 n.16.
244. 407 F. Supp. 451, 472-74 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd sub noma., Pilla v. American Bar
Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976).
245. United States v. Peterson, 550 F.2d 379, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1977) (disbarred Wis-
consin attorney attempted to represent a defendant in a federal trial held in
an area under federal jurisdiction, was convicted for unauthorized practice of
law).
246. 31 Md. App. 121, 354 A.2d 840 (1976).
247. Id. at 124, 354 A.2d at 842. In Cason, defendant faced a probation revocation
hearing. According to the court, the right to counsel attaches any time a sen-
tence may be imposed, or for other reasons where it would be an affront to
due process not to allow presence of counsel. Id. at 124, 354 A.2d at 842. Pre-
sumably under this logic any time a criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to assistance of counsel he has a corresponding constitutional right to
knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel and represent himself.
248. 430 F. Supp. 444 (D.C. 1977).
249. Id. at 447.
250. 379 A.2d 966 (D.C. 1977).
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tiate with the police without telling his attorney.25 ' The problem
with these decisions, however, is determining where the line is go-
ing to be drawn between approved defendant intrusions on
spheres of activity normally reserved for the attorney, and the rec-
ognition of a right to co-counsel status, which has been universally
rejected.25 2 Thus, in State v. Pratts,25 3 it was held per curiam that
a defendant cannot use an analogy to Faretta to demand the right
to control his defense attorney's trial strategy.254
Another unforeseen application of Faretta was to the issue of
whether a criminal defendant can waive his right to representation
by an attorney who is free from any conflict of interest. An early
post-Faretta case, United States v. Garcia,255 held that by implica-
tion, Faretta allows such a choice.256 Several federal cases fol-
lowed Garcia,257 one of the more interesting being Gray v.
Estelle,2 58 which involved an attorney who agreed to dismiss his
own suit against the defendant for stealing his typewriter in return
for the defendant agreeing to let the attorney represent him in the
pending criminal case.25 9 The attorney's motive was to gain expe-
rience as a trial lawyer.
However, other federal courts have observed that in the situa-
tion of a single attorney representing a group of alleged wrongdo-
ers the public interest in ferreting out conspirators is greatly
hampered by a rule permitting defendants to waive their right to
conflict-free counsel. Consequently, the Third Circuit in United
States v. Dolan260 expressly rejected the Garcia reasoning, hold-
ing that by preventing competing interests to develop through con-
cern for an individual client (i.e. plea-bargaining for reduced
sentences or turning into a government witness), it is easier for
such persons to "stonewall." 261 The Dolan court reasoned that
Faretta created only an independent right to self-representation,
not any implied right of absolute choice of counsel.2 62 It is unclear
251. Id. at 968. In Judge the defendant was trying to obtain favorable treatment
on another offense by cooperating on the first offense.
252. See notes 160-68 & accompanying text supra.
253. 71 N.J. 399, 365 A.2d 928 (1976).
254. Id. at 400, 365 A.2d at 929.
255. 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
256. Id. at 277.
257. Gray v. Estelle, 574 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Armedo-
Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury, 446 F. Supp. 1132,
1139 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Abraham v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 53,57 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
258. 574 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
259. Id. at 213.
260. 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978).
261. Id. at 1183.
262. Id. For an earlier federal district court decision in accord with Dolan, see In
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how future litigation will develop now that there is an apparent
split between the circuits, although the Dolan rationale seems per-
suasive when the situation involves multiple defendants attempt-
ing to stonewall an investigation or prosecution.
A final comment on extensions of Faretta is the case of State v.
Wiggins.263 The defendant first had his court appointed counsel
dismissed, but then walked out of the courtroom himself and re-
fused to conduct a defense. The trial court allowed the case to con-
tinue with no one representing the defendant. 264 The appellate
court reversed on the grounds the record showed there had not
been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.265
However, the court expressly stated that even had there been a
knowing and intelligent waiver before the defendant left the court-
room, it would be reversible error to conduct the trial in absentia,
because Faretta does not imply a correlative right to waive one's
own personal defense while also waiving representation by coun-
sel.266 The trial court was obligated to appoint an attorney to take
over when the defendant walked out.267 Although not stated, it
would seem that the case could also have been analyzed in terms
of court discretion to deal with disruptive pro se defendants by ter-
minating self-representation and reappointing counsel.268
VI. CONCLUSION
In his closing remarks to his dissent in Faretta, Justice Black-
mun observed: "I assume that many of these questions will be an-
swered with finality in due course. Many of them, however, such
as the standards of waiver and the treatment of the pro se defend-
ant, will haunt the trial of every defendant who elects to exercise
his right to self-representation. '269 Although thus far the Supreme
Court has not granted certiorari on any post-Faretta pro se cases,
the federal and state courts are beginning to delineate the scope
re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176 (D.C. 1975),
vacatedforprocedural reasons, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In that decision,
one attorney represented 100 union members, and the court approved a gov-
ernment motion (later ruled in part premature by the court of appeals) for an
order requiring certain member witnesses to obtain separate counsel. The
court reasoned that the Faretta interest in individual choice concerning the
client/attorney interest had to be balanced against the governmental interest
in law enforcement, and more larticularly the proper functioning of a grand
jury investigation. Id. at 1180.
263. 158 N.J. Super. Ct. 27, 385 A.2d 318 (1978).
264. Id. at 29-30, 385 A.2d at 319.
265. Id. at 31-32, 385 A.2d at 320.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 34-35, 385 A.2d at 321.
268. See notes 61-70 & accompanying text supra.
269. 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and consequences of this new constitutional right with a fair de-
gree of consistency. The basic right is being protected, but the
courts remain on guard against its potential abuse as a manipula-
tive device. Some of the splits and gaps may eventually be re-
solved by the Supreme Court, while others may reflect issues
which must inevitably be resolved by the facts of the particular
case, rather than by rules of law articulated by a higher court. i
such cases, guarding against abuses of discretion by trial courts
will remain the only means of protecting the constitutional right of
self-representation established by Faretta.
Donald D. Schneider '80
